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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
v. 
DUANE POTTS, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20030702-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals from an order granting defendant's motion to quash the bindover 
and dismiss the information charging one count of communications fraud, a second 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (2003). This Court has 
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (2003) and § 78-2a-3(2(e) (2002). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
Did the trial court apply incorrect legal standards in reviewing and quashing 
the bindover order? 
"[T]he ultimate decision of whether to bind a defendant over for trial presents a 
question of law." State v. Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425, 429 (Utah App. 1997), which is 
reviewed "without deference to the court below." State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 8, 20 P.3d 
300. 
This issue was preserved by the trial court's order dismissing the felony 
information. R107-110. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (2003): 
(1) Any person who has devised any scheme or artifice to defraud another 
or to obtain from another money, property, or anything of value by means 
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material 
omissions, and who communicates directly or indirectly with any person by 
any means for the purpose of executing or concealing the scheme or artifice 
is guilty of: . . . 
(e) a second degree felony when the object of the scheme or 
artifice to defraud is other than the obtaining of something of 
monetary value.. . . 
(3) Reliance on the part of any person is not a necessary element of the 
offense described in Subsection (1). 
(4) An intent on the part of the perpetrator of any offense described in 
Subsection (1) to permanently deprive any person of property, money, or thing of 
value is not a necessary element of the offense.... 
(6) (a) To communicate as described in Subsection (1) means to 
bestow, convey, make known, recount, impart; to give by way of 
information; to talk over; or to transmit information. 
(b) Means of communication include but are not limited to 
use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, television, 
newspaper, computer, and spoken and written 
communication. 
(7) A person may not be convicted under this section unless the pretenses, 
representations, promises, or material omissions made or omitted were 
made or omitted intentionally, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for 
the truth. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Amended Information filed on 21 May 2003, with 
communications fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
1801(2003). R60-61. 
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Following a preliminary hearing on 22 May 2003, defendant was bound over as 
charged. R67; Rl52:55-58. 
On 7 July 2003, defendant filed a motion to quash the bindover order and to 
dismiss the felony information. R76-90. The trial court granted defendant's motion when 
the prosecutor did not timely appear for a hearing on the matter on 1 August 2003 
R154:3. The trial court filed its written order of dismissal on 4 August 2003. R107-110. 
The State timely appealed. R133. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Defendant was fired from the Davis County Sheriffs Office in January 2000 for 
accepting a Palm Pilot from a subordinate deputy in exchange for preferential treatment. 
R152:7 (a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript is attached in addendum A). In July 
2000, defendant was reinstated after he submitted to the Career Service Council (CSC), 
his recording of the internal affairs interview that resulted in his firing. Rl 52:55-58, add. 
A. Unbeknownst to the CSC, defendant allegedly altered the recording to edit out his 
admission that he accepted the Palm Pilot. R152:13,26-27, add. A. 
The Internal Affairs Interview. Lieutenant Sparks of the Davis County Sheriffs 
Office had conducted the internal affairs interview at the sheriffs office on 20 January 
2000. Rl52:6-7, add. A. Both Lt. Sparks and defendant individually recorded the 
]The State recites the evidence at the preliminary hearing "in a light most favorable 
to the prosecution and resolv[ing] all inferences in favor of the prosecution.5' State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). 
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interview; however, Lt. Sparks' tape did not record that portion of the interview at issue 
here. R152:9, add. A. During the interview, Lt. Sparks specifically asked defendant if he 
had accepted a Palm Pilot from the subordinate deputy and defendant responded 
affirmatively. Rl 52:22-23, add. A. Defendant claimed, however, that he no longer knew 
where the Palm Pilot was, prompting Lt. Sparks to ask if it was "lost in [his] house?" 
Rl 52:23, 25, add. A. Defendant responded, "No, I can guarantee it's not in my house." 
Id. When Lt. Sparks asked if the deputy had given defendant the Palm Pilot in exchange 
for a particular assignment, defendant denied that was the purpose behind the gift. 
Rl 52:25, add. A. When Lt. Sparks asked why the deputy would give defendant such an 
expensive gift, defendant said "that [the deputy] had given him the gift in exchange for 
getting [the deputy] assigned to his crew." Rl52:26, add. A. 
Defendant's Firing, Appeal, and Reinstatement. As a result of Lt. Sparks' 
investigation, defendant was fired. R152:7, add. A. Defendant appealed his termination 
and the CSC conducted two hearings, one in March 2000 and another in July 2000. 
Rl 52:26, add. A. At the July 2000 hearing, defendant introduced his recording of Lt. 
Spark's 20 January 2000 interview. Rl 52:10-13, add. A. In the recording played for the 
CSC, however, defendant responded negatively to Lt. Sparks' question of whether he had 
accepted a Palm Pilot from a subordinate deputy. Rl52:26, add. A. Following the July 
CSC hearing, defendant was reinstated and awarded back pay and benefits. R35. 
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Investigation of Recording Submitted to the CSC. Lt. Sparks, who attended the 
July CSC hearing, noted that defendant's negative response did not comport with his 
recollection of the 20 January 2000 interview: 
When that tape was played during the hearingQ when I asked 
[defendant] the question: "Did you accept the Palm Pilot?" 
There is a simple—on the tape the answer is "No." And that is different 
than I—what I recall hearing in the interview. 
Then the conversation, which I was expecting to hear based on my 
recollection of the interview about it being lost in his house, that was not on 
the tape. 
Then, where the tape picks up is where I asked him the question "Why 
would you expect that [the deputy] would give you such an expensive gift?" 
Following that portion, the tape seems to accurately—accurately reflect 
my recollection of the interview; but[,] in the interim before that, there was 
a fairly lengthy section of conversation that was—that I did not hear on that 
tape, that I recall having during the interview. 
R152:26-27, add. A. See also R152:13, add. A ("Based on my recollection of the original 
interview and the report that I wrote immediately after, this tape was not an accurate 
recording of that interview"). 
Following the CSC hearing, defendant's recording was "taken into custody" and 
ultimately submitted to the United States Secret Service (USSS) for analysis. R152:14, 
add. A. The USSS report concluded that the recording had been edited at five different 
points on one side of the tape and that there was a 130 second difference of blank 
recording space between the edited and unedited sides of the tape. Rl 52:49-50, add. A. 
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Preliminary Hearing on Communications Fraud Charge, Defendant was 
subsequently charged with communications fraud and a preliminary hearing was held on 
22 May 2003. R60-62; R152, add. A. The preliminary hearing court heard Lt. Sparks 
testimony about the differences between his memory of the 20 January 2000 interview 
and the recording defendant submitted to the CSC. See, e.g., Rl52:6-45, add. A. The 
preliminary hearing court also received the USSS report concluding that the recording 
had been altered. See Rl 52:28-31, add. A; State's Exh. # 1. The preliminary hearing 
court found that the USSS report was admissible under rule 1102, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, rejecting defendant's claims that the report was not sufficiently reliable. Id. 
Bindover on Communications Fraud Charge, Thereafter, the preliminary 
hearing court bound defendant over for trial on the communications fraud charge. 
I have carefully listened to the testimony that has been presented by 
the [lieutenant] in this matter, as well as reviewed the audio 
authen-authenti-authentication examination report that has been admitted 
as we've discussed earlier already. 
I do find that while [defense counsel's] arguments and question raise 
very legitimate issues, that they go to the weight, such as the weight to be 
given to the witness' recollections, whether or not the differences are in fact 
alterations or whether they are the result of mistakes, are issues that are for 
the trier of fact. 
The-the State's evidence clearly shows probable cause that there 
was a-that there were differences from the recollections of the original 
interview that [Lieutenant]-is it Sparks? I'm sorry, I turned my page over 
from that-thank you, [Lt.] Sparks had with the defendant, that clearly 
showed not only answers differences [sic] but portions missing and the 
report shows that there are indications of alterations of the tape and that 
certainly shows, sufficient for a preliminary hearing, probable cause that 
there was a scheme or conduct or artifice in order to make those 
admissions-omissions or make those changes for the purposes of 
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defrauding or misrepresenting facts to the hearing board in order to 
determine whether or not [defendant] ought to be reinstated. 
So, clearly, there's probable cause that meets each of the elements of 
the communications fraud. I went through it, step by step and element by 
element. 
R152:56-57,add.A. 
In so ruling, the preliminary hearing court rejected defendant's claim that there 
was insufficient probable cause to believe that he (defendant), as opposed to his then 
counsel, committed the alleged communications fraud: 
The evidence that has been presented is that the statements were 
made and a tape was presented. The statements were made by [defendant's] 
attorney as his (defendant's) representative in a hearing where [the attorney] 
was specifically there to represent [defendant's] interest at this hearing. 
And there is-the tape certainly reflected [defendant's] language and 
the tape had been-voice, and the tape had been obtained from [defendant]. 
I find that for the purpose of the preliminary hearing, that those are 
very reasonable inferences in favor of the State that I must make and do 
find that probable cause has been shown that the statements and conduct are 
representative of [defendant's] and the fact that [defendant's attorney] may 
have been the one actually making the statements or presenting the tape, he 
was doing it as a representative of [defendant], but that the conduct and the 
scheme and the fraud that the State is alleging was in fact [defendant's] 
fraudulent behavior as far as probable cause goes. 
So, for the purposes of preliminary hearing, this matter is bound over 
as charged in Count 1, communications fraud. 
R152:57-58,add.A. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the preliminary hearing court returned the USSS 
report to the prosecutor's keeping. Rl52:59, add. A. 
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Motion to Quash and Dismiss Granted* Defendant moved to quash and dismiss 
the felony information in the trial court, but did not provide the court a copy of the USSS 
report received at the preliminary hearing, or apparently, a copy of the preliminary 
hearing transcript. See R76-90. Defendant asserted that the preliminary hearing court 
had applied an erroneous bindover standard, and that the State's evidence was insufficient 
even under the standard applied by the preliminary hearing court. R81-88. In so arguing, 
defendant did not challenge the admissibility of the USSS report, but rather, argued that it 
was irrelevant. R85-89. 
A hearing was set for 1 August 2003. R154 (a copy of the hearing transcript is 
attached in addendum B). The trial court took the bench at 8:59 a.m. R154:2, add. B. 
This case was called at 9:06 a.m. Id. While defense counsel was present, the prosecutor 
had not arrived. Id. Noting the prosecutor's absence and the lack of a written response to 
the motion to quash and dismiss, the trial court granted the motion. Id. Apparently, 
without ever reviewing the preliminary hearing transcript, the trial court noted that it was 
also ruling that the State had not met its burden of proof at the preliminary hearing. 
Rl54:3, add. B. 
The prosecutor arrived at 9:22 a.m. and asked to reopen the case, indicating that 
she had planned to orally argue the motion to quash and to dismiss. R154:4, add. B. The 
trial court declined to reopen, but accepted the prosecutor's written opposition to 
defendant's motion. R154:5, add. B. See R94-98. 
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On 4 August 2003, the State filed a motion opposing the proposed dismissal order 
and requesting reconsideration. R99-106. The prosecutor argued that quashing the 
bindover and dismissing the charge were severe remedies for her tardiness and that the 
court should at least facially consider the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing. 
Rl00-101. The prosecutor also filed an affidavit apologizing for her tardiness and 
pointing out that she had "not been tardy for any other court appearance in th[e] case." 
R104. 
The trial court's written order granting defendant's motion to quash and dismiss 
was also filed on 4 August 2003. R107-109 (a copy is attached in addendum C). The 
trial court identified three reasons for its ruling: The State's failures to establish probable 
cause to believe that a communications fraud occurred, that communications fraud or any 
crime was committed by defendant, and the State's failure to "respond[] or appear[]" at 
the motion hearing. R108, add. C. 
Post-Ruling Motions. On 11 August 2003, defendant moved to strike the State's 
memorandum in opposition to his motion to quash and dismiss. Rl 11-112. On 22 
August 2003, defendant also filed an affidavit by his investigator alleging that the 
prosecutor had been late for court "on several occasions," and that the defense team was 
always "timely." Rl 16. 
The prosecutor filed a reply affidavit and request for reconsideration on 26 August 
2003, pointing out that defendant's allegations regarding her tardiness on other occasions 
were unsupported. Rl 19-124. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Quashing the bindover order and dismissing the felony information is a 
disproportionate sanction for the prosecutor's tardiness. In the interest of public justice 
and to warrant dismissal of criminal charges, a prosecutor's tardiness must involve a 
failure of justice or prejudice to a defendant. As defendant alleged no prejudice and none 
was found by Judge Frederick, his ruling should be reversed and this case remanded for 
trial on the merits. 
Judge Frederick's ruling must also be reversed because it was based on an 
incomplete record. In moving to quash and dismiss, defendant failed to provide the judge 
with a copy State's Exh. # 1, the USSS analysis of defendant's recording which was 
received and relied upon by the preliminary hearing court, or even a transcript of the 
preliminary hearing. Even assuming Judge Frederick had access to and reviewed the 
preliminary hearing transcript, the judge could not properly review or reverse the decision 
of the preliminary hearing court because absent the USSS report, the complete record was 
not before him. Accordingly, Judge Frederick's dismissal was error and the bindover 
over should be reinstated. 
Finally, Judge Frederick misapplied the bindover standard by failing to view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State and to draw all reasonable inferences in 
the State's favor. The judge thus erred in failing to recognize that Lt. Sparks' testimony 
constituted prima facie and credible evidence that defendant committed communications 
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fraud when he submitted his edited recording to the CSC to gain reinstatement. The 
erroneous ruling should be reserved and this case remanded for trial on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED PERTINENT LEGAL 
STANDARDS IN REVIEWING AND QUASHING THE BINDOVER 
ORDER; THEREFORE, THE RESULTANT DISMISSAL OF THE 
FELONY INFORMATION IS ERRONEOUS AND SHOULD BE 
REVERSED 
When the prosecutor failed to timely appear for a scheduled hearing on 
defendant's motion to quash the bindover and dismiss the felony information, Judge 
Frederick summarily granted the motion: "I'm going to grant your motion, [defense 
counsel], on the basis that there's been a failure by the State to respond in appropriate 
fashion." R154:3, add. B. At defense counsel's request, Judge Frederick secondarily 
ruled that dismissal was also appropriate based on the State's failure to establish probable 
cause. Id, Judge Frederick erred in quashing the bindover and dismissing the felony 
information merely because the prosecutor was tardy for a hearing. The erroneous ruling 
should be reversed and this case remanded for trial. 
A. Judge Frederick Abused His Discretion in Applying the 
Severe Sanction of Dismissal Where, as Here, the 
Prosecutor Was Merely Tardy. 
Judge Frederick quashed the bindover and dismissed the felony information here 
merely because the prosecutor was tardy for a scheduled hearing on defendant's motion. 
R154:3, add. B. The prosecutor's tardiness does not warrant such a severe and far-
reaching sanction. 
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held in a similar case involving a tardy 
prosecutor that trial courts "must have authority to regulate attendance upon its schedule 
and concomitant authority to sanction a breach/5 but dismissal of criminal charges is 
generally unwarranted. See Commonwealth v. Carson, 510 A.2d 1233, 1235 (Pa. 1986). 
Rather, "the sanction must be visited upon the offender and not upon the interests of 
public justice." Id. Dismissal of a civil action may be an appropriate remedy when a 
party fails to observe the orders of a court "because there the loss falls upon private 
interests"; however, it does not follow that dismissal is an appropriate remedy in the 
criminal arena. Id. This is because "[c]riminal cases involve issues of public justice; 
issues that transcend the immediate parties. In criminal cases, sanctions may be imposed 
upon individuals, including counsel for either side; sanctions that vindicate the authority 
of the court to maintain its schedule and enforce its orders." Id. According to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, to warrant dismissal of criminal charges, a prosecutor's 
tardiness "must involve a failure of justice or prejudice to a defendant." Id. When, as 
here, "such interests are not involved, the offending party may be otherwise sanctioned 
without defeating the public interest." Id. See also Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 712 A.2d 
749, 752 (Pa. 1998) (holding that dismissal of a felony information is a "severe sanction" 
that should be used only in instances of "absolute necessity"). Accord People ex. rel. 
Dept. of Revenue v. Countryman, 514N.E.2d 1038, 1041 (111. App. 1987) (setting aside 
dismissal absent an intentional or wilful disregard of the court's order to appear). 
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Because defendant alleged no prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's tardiness 
below and Judge Frederick found none, the disproportionate sanction of dismissal should 
be reversed. 
B. Judge Frederick Erred in Dismissing the Felony 
Information on an Incomplete Record. 
In addition to being a disproportionate sanction for the prosecutor's tardiness, 
Judge Frederick's dismissal of the felony information because "[the State] had not met 
[its] burden," see R154:3, add. B, was erroneously based on an incomplete record. See 
State v. Wodskow, 896 P.2d 29, 32 (Utah App. 1995). In Wodskow, this Court held that 
the trial court erred in quashing the bindover order "because it reviewed an incomplete 
transcript of the preliminary hearing, which lacked the magistrate's oral findings on the 
witnesses' credibility." Id. 
Here, Judge Frederick similarly reviewed an incomplete record. Specifically, it is 
not clear that defendant provided a copy of the preliminary hearing transcript to Judge 
Frederick in moving to quash and dismiss. See R76-90. Additionally, defendant failed to 
provide Judge Frederick with a copy of State's Exh. # 1 (the USSS analysis of 
defendant's recording), which was received by the preliminary hearing court, but returned 
to the prosecutor at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing. See Rl 52:29-31, 59, add. 
A. As the moving party, it was defendant's responsibility to provide the complete 
preliminary hearing record to Judge Frederick. Wodskow, 896 P.2d 32 n.3. Even 
assuming Judge Frederick had access to the preliminary hearing transcript and read it, 
precisely because State's Exh. # 1 was not before him, Judge Frederick "could not 
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properly review and subsequently reverse the decision of the magistrate[.]" Id. 
Accordingly, Judge Frederick's dismissal was erroneous, and the bindover order should 
be reinstated. 
C. Judge Frederick Failed to Properly Apply the Bindover 
Standard. 
Finally, even if the Court were to overlook the incomplete record upon which 
Judge Frederick ruled, the judge failed to properly apply the bindover standard. Judge 
Frederick's order quashing the bindover and dismissing the felony information should 
therefore be reversed. 
Bindover Standard. It is well established that at a preliminary hearing, "the 
prosecution must present evidence sufficient for the magistrate to find [pjrobable cause to 
believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed 
it." State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1998) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). Magistrates must "view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution." Id. at 437-438 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). Additionally, "[u]nless the evidence is wholly 
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the 
[prosecution's] claim, the magistrate should bind the defendant over for trial." Id 
(citations omitted). 
In State v. Clark, the Utah Supreme Court took the opportunity to further 
"elucidate" just "what quantum of evidence is sufficient to support a finding of probable 
cause at the preliminary hearing stage of a prosecution." 2001 UT 9, ^ 11-14, 20 P.3d 
14 
200. The Court equated the probable cause standard for bindover and the probable cause 
standard for arrest warrants, recognizing that there was no "principled basis for 
attempting to maintain a distinction between the arrest warrant probable cause standard 
and the preliminary hearing probable cause standard. . . Therefore, at both the arrest 
warrant and preliminary hearing stages, the prosecution must present sufficient evidence 
to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it." Id. at f 16. Moreover, "this evidence need not be capable of supporting a 
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at f 15. 
This Case. Judge Frederick's quashing of the bindover order, even on this 
incomplete record, amounts to a refusal to draw any prosecution favorable inferences, in 
clear contravention of the bindover standard. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ffif 10-11. Defendant's 
motion to quash and dismiss effectively concedes that the recording submitted to the CSC 
was altered, but merely disputes the materiality of the edits or that defendant was the 
person that made them. See R80-81, 85-89. Thus, the evidence in this case is susceptible 
to the following two inferences: (1) that Lt. Sparks misremembered his internal affairs 
interview with defendant and in spite of the editing, the recording submitted to the CSC 
accurately reflects the substance of the internal affairs interview, or (2) that Lt. Sparks 
accurately recalled his interview with defendant and defendant deliberately altered the 
recording to facilitate his bid for reinstatement to the sheriffs office. Viewed in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437-38, and drawing all reasonable 
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inferences in the prosecution's favor, Clark, 2001 UT 9, f^f 10-11, the preliminary 
evidence more reasonably supports the latter theory. 
Indeed, the preliminary hearing established that Lt. Sparks' recall of the interview 
differed dramatically from that portion of the recording defendant submitted to the CSC. 
Specifically, Lt. Sparks remembered that defendant admitted receiving the palm pilot "in 
exchange for getting [the deputy] assigned to his crew." Rl52:26, add. A. When 
defendant played his recording for the CSC, however, Lt. Sparks heard defendant respond 
negatively to his question of whether he had accepted a Palm Pilot from a subordinate 
deputy. Id. Lt. Sparks thus suspected that defendant's recording of the interview had 
been edited, which suspicion was confirmed by the USSS. Rl 52:50, add. A. 
Based on these facts, the State presented sufficient evidence which, when viewed 
"in a light most favorable to the prosecution" was not "wholly lacking and incapable of 
reasonable inference to prove" that defendant intentionally submitted an edited recording 
to the CSC in order to gain reinstatement to the sheriffs office. Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437-
38. This alleged scheme to defraud the CSC is a prima facie violation of the 
communications fraud statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1801 (2003). Judge Frederick 
thus erred in quashing the bindover order and dismissing the felony information. 
Of course, the State's reading of the evidence need not be correct, only reasonable. 
As stated previously, in determining whether "the State has shown probable cause," a 
court will view "the evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in a light most 
favorable to the State. . ." Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 20. Thus, where "the facts give rise to two 
16 
[or more] alternative inferences/' one of which would support probable cause, nothing 
more is required. Id. The State's theory of culpability is a reasonable one, if not the only 
reasonable theory on these facts. Therefore, Judge Frederick clearly ignored the bindover 
standard in refusing to draw all reasonable inferences in support of the prosecution theory 
that defendant intentionally and knowingly schemed to submit the edited recording to the 
CSC in order to regain his career status. Precisely because a trier of fact could reasonably 
believe defendant knowingly and intentionally submitted the altered recording to the 
CSC, and because the State's case is presumed only to strengthen by the time of trial, 
Judge Frederick's ruling should be reversed and this case remanded for trial on the merits. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, % 10. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse and remand this matter for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on J0_ March 2004. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
/Assistant Attorney General 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: —hearing on State versus Duane Potts. 
If there is a natural break and we can take some of the 
changes of plea on the other, we can do that, or we can 
address them later. 
Mr. Potts is now seated at—or sitting at table with 
Mr. Yengich, and Ms. Samuels, Polly Samuels is here 
representing the Attorney General today. 
The amended Information that I have before me 
involves a single count, communications fraud, on—charged to 
have been committed on January 20th, in or about July—to or 
on or about July 21st of 2000, so January 20th to July 21 of 
2000, at the Davis County address. 
Is there a reason why this is—is that information 
correct? It does say— 
MS. SAMUELS: Yes, that's correct, your Honor. 
This—Mr. Potts was a member of the Davis County Sheriff's 
Department and the judge in Davis County recused himself from 
hearing— 
THE COURT: Okay. So, that's why it is here before 
the Third District. All right. Thank you. 
So, in the Davis County and with that explanation, 
that is the reason that it is here for a preliminary hearing. 
Does Mr. Potts waive any more formal reading of the 
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1 Information? 
2 MR. YENGICH: He does, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: And—thank you. 
4 MR. YENGICH: And the Court should be aware that 
5 Judge Skanchy has already heard part of this preliminary 
6 hearing. I don't know if you were aware of that. 
7 THE COURT: And as I was just looking through the 
8 file, I do see that Judge Skanchy had heard part of the—of a 
9 motion to dismiss. 
10 MR. YENGICH: That's right. 
11 THE COURT: Was—was that during the course of the 
12 preliminary hearing? 
13 MR. YENGICH: It was prior to the preliminary 
14 hearing. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Well, I don't have—and—and 
16 he had—also had started hearing the preliminary hearing? 
17 MR. YENGICH: No. 
18 MS. SAMUELS: No. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. So, there has been no preliminary 
20 hearing and so I can certainly begin taking that evidence now 
21 J and now have any problem with what has already been handled by 
22 I another judge. 
23 I MR. YENGICH: And we would move the exclusion of 
24 | witnesses, your Honor. 
25 I THE COURT: All there. There is only of my 
understanding one witness that the State anticipates calling. 
Are there any other potential witnesses that are in the 
courtroom that the State is aware of and— 
MS. SAMUELS: No, your Honor. We—we have an 
Attorney General investigator, but I'm not anticipating 
calling her at this hearing. 
MR. YENGICH: If she's a potential witness, I'd ask 
that she be excused. 
THE COURT: And there may—is—I—is she your agent 
for the case? 
MS. SAMUELS: Yes. She is. 
THE COURT: The statute does provide then that as an 
agent, even with a potential witness, that I will go ahead and 
allow her to stay in and she will not be testifying today. 
All right. Does the defense anticipate any 
witnesses, Mr. Yengich? 
MR. YENGICH: Not at this time. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Then let's have your witness brought forward and be 
sworn and we can start the preliminary hearing. 
MS. SAMUELS: The State calls Captain Kelly Sparks. 
THE COURT: Okay. Captain, if you'll step forward 
and be sworn. 
KELLY SPARKS, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this 
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matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the 
witness stand and was examined and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Thank you. 
Ms. Samuels. 
MS. SAMUELS: Okay. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. SAMUELS: 
Q Captain Sparks, how long have you been a police 
officer for? 
A Just over 20 years. 
Q And whom do you work for? 
A For the Davis County Sheriff's Office. 
Q And how long have you been a captain for? 
A For just a couple of weeks. 
Q Now, I'm going to draw your attention to an Internal 
Affairs investigation involving Duane Potts in January of 
2000. Were you involved in that investigation? 
A I was. I was assigned that investigation. 
Q Okay. And during that investigation, did you 
interview the defendant, Duane Potts? 
A I did. 
Q And can you briefly tell us about that? 
A The investigation included a number of allegations, 
the most central of those allegations was that Mr. Potts had 
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accepted a gratuity from a subordinate officer in exchange for 
special consideration for an area work assignment. 
Q Okay. .And what was that gratuity? 
A A gratuity was a palm pilot, electronic device. 
Q Okay. And did you question Mr. Potts about the 
allegations in this I.A. investigation? 
A I did. 
Q And what were the circumstances of that? Was it 
recorded? Where was that investi— 
A I— 
Q Where was that interview? 
A That interview took place in my office at the Davis 
County Sheriff's Office. I was recording the interview and 
Mr. Potts was recording the interview as well. 
Q Okay. And in that interview, did you ask him about 
the palm pilot? 
A I did. 
Q Now, did you attend a hearing later in—well, let me 
ask you, subsequent to that internal investigations—Internal 
Affairs investigation, was Mr. Potts dismissed? 
A Yes. He was terminated. 
Q And—and subsequent to that, did you attend a Career 
Service Council hearing in 2000? 
A I did. 
Q And was that concerning the reinstatement of Mr. 
7 
Potts? 
A Yes. 
Q And did—did the defendant present a tape of the 
interview which you conducted in January of 2000 at that 
hearing? 
A There were actually two hearings. The initial 
hearing, I believe was in March. The tape was not presented 
then, there was a recess— 
MR. YENGICH: Objection, foundation. Excuse me. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
MR. YENGICH: Objection. Foundation as to who 
presented it and the circumstances. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll ask Ms. Samuels to ask those 
foundational questions. 
MS. SAMUELS: Okay. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) Who presented—well, who presented 
this—why don't we first go back to the—in the March hearing, 
was the question of your interview with Mr. Potts, was that a 
part of the council hearing? 
A It was. 
Q And was— 
THE COURT: And this was March of when? 
MS. SAMUELS: Of 2000. 
THE COURT: 2000, as well? Okay. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) And was the subject of this 
8 
council hearing about the reinstatement of the defendant? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And did Mr.—did the defendant present a tape 
to the council—to the council? 
A At the first hearing, there was no tape presented. 
I—the recording that I had of the interview, part of the tape 
that I made was not recorded, apparently when the tape was 
turned over— 
MR. YENGICH: Objection without further foundation. 
When he says "apparently". 
THE COURT: And—and I'll—for foundation, go ahead 
and establish the purposes, but I would like the witness to 
explain what he did, what he is aware of, rather than 
prefacing it with "apparently". 
THE WITNESS: I recorded the interview. When I was 
finished recording the interview, found that one of the sides 
of one of the tapes of that interview was not recorded. I 
believe it to be a mechanical malfunction of the recorder. 
MR. YENGICH: Objection and ask that that portion be 
stricken. 
THE COURT: Sustained. His testimony that as he 
reviewed the tape, that one portion was missing is admitted. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) And was the defendant recording 
the conversation at the same time that you were recording it? 
A He was. 
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Q Okay, And at the second council hearing, were you 
presented with a—with Mr.—with the defendant's tape? 
A Yes. It was played in the hearing. 
Q Okay. And who presented that tape? 
A The counsel that was representing Mr. Potts. 
Q Now, did you listen to that tape? 
A Yes. 
Q And was that tape an accurate recording of your 
interview in January, 2000? 
MR. YENGICH: Objection, foundation. 
THE COURT: Well, he was present at that hearing, so 
I'll— 
MR. YENGICH: He was—he was present, but the 
foundation for the—the foundational objection is, is on what 
basis he makes that decision, whether or not he compared it 
with his own tape— 
THE COURT: And he may—and Ms. Samuels may ask 
those questions to establish the—the foundation. 
MS. SAMUELS: Okay. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) You were present when you 
interviewed the defendant in January, 2000; correct? 
A Yes. I was. 
Q And you listened—you listened to—you asked 
questions and you listened to the defendant's responses? 
A Yes. 
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Q And when you listened—and you were pre—you 
listened to a tape that was presented by the defendant as the 
tape that recorded your—your interview with the defendant? 
A Yes. 
MR. YENGICH: Objection, foundation and—and it's— 
and it's inaccurate, it was presented by his counsel. 
THE COURT: Overruled. You may continue with the— 
MR. YENGICH: Well—well—but—but the issue here— 
THE COURT: —foundation— 
MR. YENGICH: —is, it's a communications fraud 
issue. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YENGICH: And the claim is that this tape that 
was admitted by his lawyer is the subject of the 
communications fraud. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YENGICH: Okay? So, it is inaccurate to say 
that it was admitted by Mr. Potts. It was admitted by his 
counsel. That's the testimony. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YENGICH: And that is crit—that's a critical 
distinction to be made, even at the preliminary hearing. 
THE COURT: Okay. If—Ms. Samuels, if you'd ask 
some further foundational questions as to what was occurring 
at the hearing, when it was presented, if counsel was 
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representing Mr. Potts at a hearing that—where he was the 
subject of the hearing and whether or not counsel was there, 
present, representing the defendant at that hearing. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) Was counsel representing the 
defendant at that hearing? 
A Yes. He was. 
Q And did that counsel, I believe his name is Jerry 
Conder, present a tape on behalf of the defendant? 
A It was Jerry Conder, and yes, he did present that 
tape and played it at the hearing, while I was present. 
Q And did he—and did he in the hearing present that 
tape as the tape that Mr.—that the defendant recorded while 
you interviewed him in January of 2000? 
A Yes. He did. 
Q Okay. And did you listen to that tape? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q And was that tape an accurate recording of that 
January 2000 interview? 
MR. YENGICH: Objection, foundation. 
THE COURT: Overruled. He's stated the foundation 
that he had heard—he was present for the earlier conversation 
and had now heard this one. He may now answer as to the—his 
comparison. 
I have one other question: Was the defendant 
present at the time that this was presented by Jerry Conder? 
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THE WITNESS: Yes, he was. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
You may re-ask the question as to how the— 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) Was this tape an accurate 
representation of your interview of the defendant in January 
of 2000? 
A Based on my recollection of the original interview 
and the report that I wrote immediately after, this tape was 
not an accurate recording of that interview. 
Q And can you describe to the Court how it was not 
accurate? 
A There are portions of the tape that conversation 
that I recall having with Mr. Potts that I referenced in the 
report, that had been deleted from— 
MR. YENGICH: Objection. 
THE WITNESS: —that tape. 
MR. YENGICH: Objection that they had been deleted. 
That's conclusion of the witness. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) For some of the tape, did the tape 
actually reflect the interview that you had of the defendant? 
A Yes. Some of it was. 
Q And then on some parts of it, to your recollection, 
there was items that were not in the tape, that you recall 
having been stated? 
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1 A Yes. There was conversation missing that I recalled 
2 and there were answers that were not as I recalled them. 
3 Q And what happened to the tape after the hearing? 
4 A The tape was submitted at the hearing as a exhibit 
5 and was taken into custody and I don't have the details on the 
6 chain of custody following that, but it was submitted to the 
7 personnel director, which would be Steven Baker. 
8 Q Okay. And were you informed that it was submitted 
9 to the Secret Service? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q And was that from another law enforcement— 
12 A Yes. That was from Chief Deputy Kevin McCloud. 
13 Q Okay. And I'm going to show to defense counsel a 
14 copy of the report from the Secret Service, there's actually 
15 three parts, all three have been turned over to defense 
16 counsel. 
17 I MR. YENGICH: I have copies of these. 
18 | THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
19 ] MS. SAMUELS: And I'm—I'm going to ask that this be 
20 J introduced into evidence. 
21 I MR. YENGICH: Objection as to foundation and as to 
22 | the ability to confront it. 
23 I THE COURT: Let—let's have it marked and as to the 
24 I foundational objection, Ms. Samuels will have an opportunity 
25 | to establish foundation from it, but she has moved to admit it 
14 
at this time and there—and I'm going to allow her to 
establish the foundation. 
As to the objection to confrontation, we'll address 
that momentarily. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) So, in the hearing, were you 
informed by Mr. McCloud, that the—that the tape that the 
defendant submitted—submitted through his counsel, was an 
exhibit in the hearing? 
MR. YENGICH: Objection, it's leading. And 
objection, it's hearsay. 
THE COURT: For foundational purposes, I'm going to 
overrule and allow you to ask the question. 
THE WITNESS: I'm not sure that I understand what 
the question is. 
MS. SAMUELS: I'm sorry. I got kind of long-winded. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) Did—were you informed by Mr. 
McCloud, or let's see, by Officer McCloud, that the tape was, 
first of all, admitted into evidence in—in the hearing? 
A Yes. 
Q And this—and that tape, which I believe was marked 
Exhibit No. 2 in the hearing, was the tape that was submitted 
on the defendant's behalf as the tape that he recorded during 
that January 20th— 
MR. YENGICH: Objection— 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
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MS. SAMUELS: —(inaudible) 
MR. YENGICH: —it's leading. She—she's 
effectively testifying. 
THE COURT: Overruled for the purposes of foundation 
on this. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) And were you informed by—by 
Officer McCloud that the—that the Exhibit No. 2, which was 
the tape, was sent on to the Secret Service? 
A Yes. 
MR. YENGICH: Objection. Hearsay, foundation and 
I'm going to object on the basis of confrontation and—and at 
the preliminary hearing on the residual hearsay rule. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Response to those objections? 
MS. SAMUELS: Your Honor, under Rule 11-02, reliable 
hearsay in criminal preliminary examinations, Subsection 
(b)(3), evidence establishing the foundation for or the 
authenticity of any exhibit is allowed. 
And in addition, the—I just lost the subsection—a-
-a statement of non—of a non-testifying peace officer to a 
testifying peace officer is allowed. And that is Subsection 
(6). 
MR. YENGICH: Here's the difference. The threshold 
requirement of reliability. Counsel is laying out a scenario 
that she believes occurred and asking him to confirm or deny 
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that fact. He's not testifying as to the statements that were 
made to him, nor is he testifying about the chain of custody 
on a specific piece of evidence. 
There's no way for this—this gentleman and—and 
under the most recent cases on preliminary hearings, 
confrontation does apply and reliable hearsay requires a 
degree of reliability. What the—what she's asking the Court 
to accept would not even be acceptable reliable hearsay under 
Illinois vs. Gates for a search warrant. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
At—at this point, the hearsay objection as to the 
reliability of the report itself, I'm still taking under 
advisement because I'm trying to get to the foundational 
issues there that will determine whether or not this is 
sufficiently reliable to be admitted under Rule 11-02. 
The objection, as I understand it, is that even in 
establishing that foundation, Mr. Yengich is objecting for the 
defense to whether or not there—there is hearsay in the 
foundation. 
Am I misunderstanding that? 
MR. YENGICH: Well, no, you—you're correct, but 
it's got to be reliable hearsay in the foundation as well. 
THE COURT: And that's—and that's what I'm asking 
for, the—for counsel to respond to, as to the underlying 
hearsay in establishing the foundation of this report and when 
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it was admitted. 
I'm going to allow you, taking under advisement the 
objection, because I'm dealing with three different issues and 
three different objections here, to continue in establishing 
foundation, but—but you do need to address the issue of the 
hearsay objection to this, the officer, I guess, admitting 
the—the tape, the—the—whoever it was who admitted the tape 
in the hearsay. That's the initial hearsay objection. 
MR. YENGICH: Well, yeah, may I—may I voir dire on 
one question? 
THE COURT: Please do. 
MR. YENGICH: Okay. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. YENGICH: 
Q The tape that was offered, do you know, do you know 
independently, whether or not that was a copy of—of an 
original tape or was it—whether it was an original tape? 
A I do not know independently. 
MR. YENGICH: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's the objection. 
Response? 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continuing^ 
BY MS. SAMUELS: 
Q But did—the tape that was submitted to the Secret 
Service was the tape which was submitted on behalf of the 
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defendant in the hearing to represent his recording of that 
January 2000 interview? 
A During—during the hearing, they said that it was 
the— 
MR. YENGICH: Well— 
THE WITNESS: —original tape. 
THE COURT: And in—were—was this witness present 
at the time that it was admitted? 
Was this—at the time it was proffered? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Put some foundational questions then on 
what he heard about this tape, himself, in person, at that 
hearing. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) What did you hear about this 
tape— 
MR. YENGICH: And— 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) —that was— 
MR. YENGICH: —and again, from whom? 
THE COURT: And those are appropriate questions. 
THE WITNESS: Mr. Conder, the—Mr. Potts' counsel, 
present in the hearing with Mr. Potts submitted this tape as 
the original recording that Mr. Potts had made and also had a 
recording device there, which he said was the original 
recording device that it was made on. 
THE COURT: And that was Mr. Conder7s statement? 
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THE WITNESS: That was Mr. Conder, yes. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) And was the defendant present as 
well in that— 
A He was. 
THE COURT: Were—did you hear that tape at the 
hearing? Is that when you listened to it? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. I heard portions of that tape at 
that hearing. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) And the portions that you heard, 
did they reflect parts of the conversation which you had in— 
in your interview of the defendant? 
A Yes. They did. 
Q And did they also reflect omissions and alterations 
of—of that interview? 
A Yes. They did. 
MR. YENGICH: Objection, it's leading. He 
indicated—and—and it's—there's no foundation. He said he 
heard portions of the tape. 
THE COURT: More specific answers in what he heard 
and what is there; but as far as the leading, this is 
foundational and I am willing to allow Ms. Samuels to continue 
asking specifically, he's not—she's not suggesting an answer, 
she's just asking specifically enough so that I can know what 
portions of the tape and portions of the evidence is being 
referred to. 
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So, the leading objection is overruled, but I do 
want as much foundational testimony that this witness actually 
heard and observed at the hearing concerning this tape. 
MS. SAMUELS: Okay. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) So, during the hearing, can you 
briefly tell the Court what—what occurred during the 
submission by Mr. Conder of this tape? 
A Mr. Conder played the tape during the hearing. The 
portion of the tape that he played was the portion of the tape 
where Mr. Potts and I had a conversation in the interview 
about whether or not he had accepted a palm pilot from Deputy 
Sorensen. While I listened to that tape, I also had 
recollection of the interview and parts of the tape were an 
accurate reflection of that interview and parts of the tape 
were not an accurate reflection of that interview. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm overruling the initial 
hearsay objection then. This witness was present at the time 
that he heard this tape and I am satisfied that the— 
MR. YENGICH: May I ask a voir dire question? 
THE COURT: You may. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. YENGICH: 
Q How much—how long was the tape that was played at 
that hearing, how long did it take it to be played in your 
presence? 
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A I couldn't say specifically how long. 
Q Could you— 
A My—my estimate— 
Q —(inaudible) 
A —would be one to two minutes7— 
Q Okay. 
A —worth of tape. 
Q So, you didn't hear the entirety of the tape that 
was offered by Mr. Conder at that hearing? 
A I did not. 
Q Okay. 
MR. YENGICH: Then I would renew the objection. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continuing^ 
BY MS. SAMUELS; 
Q And—and what alterations—or how was that tape 
different? Can you give some examples to the Court about the 
difference between what—your recollection of the interview 
and what was on the tape? 
A Yes. 
Q During the interview, I asked Mr. Potts specifically 
if he had accepted a palm pilot from Mr. Sorensen. Mr. Potts 
stated that Mr. Sorensen brought this palm pilot to his house, 
that he said, aw, you don't have to do that, but that they— 
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that he did deliver the palm pilot, that Mr. Potts did take 
it. Mr. Potts specifically said—during the interview said, 
But I don't know where it's at. And I said, You don't know 
where it's at? Is it lost in your house? And he said, No, I 
can guarantee it's not in my house. 
Following this conversation, after Mr. Potts said 
that he had brought it—had brought it to his house, had left 
it there, I asked Mr. Potts if he had— 
MR. YENGICH: Objection as to—and—and again, my 
objection is—and this is the problem with this, Judge, 
"following this conversation". Now, is he talking about the 
conversation he had at the time— 
THE COURT: And—and he— 
MR. YENGICH: —and does "following" mean 
immediately following it? Does it mean later on in the tape? 
Or when does—does it mean? 
Without—without the State admitting the tape into 
evidence and playing it to the Court, the Court is left to 
speculate on these matters, and the Court—even at a 
preliminary hearing, the Court can't speculate as to these 
things. 
They want the Court to believe that there was an 
altered tape. They don't have anybody to testify about it, 
other than this gentleman who says, and his testimony was: 
"My recollection was different." 
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THE COURT: And that—and I am accepting that 
testimony as admissible, that this witness may testify 
pursuant to his recollections as to what the differences were. 
He has not testified, I have sustained the objections that—to 
him testifying that they were alterations, that they were 
anything speculative; I am simply accepting this witness' 
testimony today of what his recollection was of the interview 
that originally occurred and of the tape that he listened to 
at the hearing and the differences. That is all that is being 
presented at this time. That is what I'm admitting at this 
time. 
Objection overruled. 
Continue as to the specific differences that this 
witness recalls from his being present at both the interview 
and the playing of the—the tape at the—the hearing in March. 
I would ask that there not be pronouns used and that 
we specifically refer to which interview, whether it was the 
original interview or the one on the tape of the hearing and 
what time frames we are talking about. So, immediately 
following, that sort of thing, actually give times, moments, 
hours, whatever. 
Thank you. 
MS. SAMUELS: Okay. You may continue. 
THE COURT: You may need to re-ask the question— 
MS. SAMUELS: Okay. 
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THE COURT: —so that we can— 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) So, let's first go to the issue of 
the palm pilot; what do you recall, what was different between 
your recollection of the initial interview and the defendant's 
copy of the tape? 
A During my original interview, Mr. Potts was asked 
the question, Did you accept the palm pilot? 
He replied that Mr. Sorensen did bring the palm 
pilot to his house, did leave it at his house. 
He also said at that time that he did not know where 
the palm pilot was. 
I immediately asked him, What do you mean, you don't 
know where it was? Is it lost, is it misplaced somewhere in 
your house? 
His reply was, No, I can guarantee it's not in my 
house. 
I then immediately asked him, Did you—did he give 
you the palm pilot in exchange for being assigned south, south 
end of Davis County? 
His reply was, No, he did not. It was not ever an 
exchange. 
I then immediately asked him, Why would—why would 
he give you such an expensive gift? Why would he give you a 
three or four hundred dollar gift? You didn't have a close 
personal relationship where that sort of thing would be 
25 
appropriate. 
Mr. Potts' reply to that question was that he 
believed that he had given him the gift in exchange for 
getting him assigned to his crew. This was a new employee who 
was just coming onto out—finishing school and coming to work 
for us. Mr. Potts said that he believed the exchange of the 
gift was for getting him assigned to his crew. 
During the hearing when I listened to the tape, 
after— 
THE COURT: And this is the March 2000 hearing? 
THE WITNESS: This is—no, this would be the 
second— 
MS. SAMUELS: This would be July— 
THE COURT: July, okay. 
THE WITNESS: —hearing in July. 
THE COURT: Okay. July. Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: When that tape was played during the 
hearing when I asked Mr. Potts the question: Did you accept 
the palm pilot? 
There is a simple—on the tape the answer is "No." 
And that is different than I—what I recall hearing in the 
interview. 
Then the conversation, which I was expecting to hear 
based on my recollection of the interview about it being lost 
in his house, that was not on the tape. 
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Then, where the tape picks up is where I asked him 
the question, "Why would you expect that Mr. Sorensen would 
give you such an expensive gift?" 
Following that portion, the tape seems to 
accurately—accurately reflect my recollection of the 
interview; but in the interim before that, there was a fairly 
lengthy section of conversation that was—that I did not hear 
on that tape, that I recall having during the interview. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) Okay. And do you recall any other 
instances of there being a difference between your interview 
and the tape? 
A That's the only one that I can recall specifically. 
Q Now—and then after the tape was admitted into 
evidence at the hearing,— 
MR. YENGICH: Objection. If he knows it was 
admitted. It was offered, whether or not it was admitted. 
THE COURT: You may ask whether he knows whether it 
was— 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) Do you know whether that tape was 
admitted into evidence at the hearing? 
A Yes. It was ad—it was admitted and given to the 
personnel director, Steven Baker. 
Q Okay. And what happened to the tape after that? 
A I have been informed by Chief Deputy McCloud that 
the tape was then submitted to the United States Secret 
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Service for analysis and that a report was sent back from the 
Secret Service with the analysis of the tape that was 
submitted. 
Q Okay. And have you seen that report? 
A I have. 
Q Okay. And does that report reflect the tape, to 
your knowledge? 
A Yeah. The—the report validates what I heard— 
MR. YENGICH: Objection as to what the report does 
or not does validate. 
THE COURT: Okay. Wellf sustained on that. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) Does the re— 
THE COURT: As—just—just the statements that that 
officer gave to this testifying officer, is all I'm going to 
look to for the 11-02 exception. 
MS. SAMUELS: Okay. 
At this point, your Honor, I'd ask that the Secret 
Service report be admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 1. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YENGICH: Objection, foundation. Objection, 
hearsay. And objection, confrontation. Objection as to the 
reliability of it. 
The Court does not have the foundation for the 
individual that submitted it, the Court doesn't have any 
indication as to whether it was the same tape, whether it was 
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a—an—another tape, whether there was any indication of what 
happened be—with the tape at that hearing. The Court, at 
this point, doesn't even know whether or not it was a copy of 
the tape. The Court—the Court has no understanding or 
knowledge of any of that. 
And the Court certainly doesn't have any indication 
as to the—the reliability of this particular report. This 
gentleman had nothing to do with this report. 
THE COURT: Any response? 
MS. SAMUELS: Your Honor, in response, whether or 
not—whatever—what we do know is that the tape which was 
submitted on the defendant's behalf, that was admitted into 
evidence at the hearing, which was played at the hearing, is 
the tape which was sent to the Secret Service and the report 
was done on, based on—on Detective—or Captain Sparks' 
testimony as well as what he was informed by a fellow officer, 
And based upon that, that report should be allowed 
to come in. 
MR. YENGICH: But you don't know that, your Honor. 
That's the—that's the lacking in the chain he—chain, here. 
You don't know that, number one. 
And you don't have any independent proof of the 
reliability of the report and the people that prepared the 
report. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
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Purposes of the 11-02 rule is to provide for this 
type of evidence to be admitted for the purposes of a 
preliminary hearing, not for any other purposes. The same 
rules of hearsay, the same rules of chain witnesses are 
precisely what this rule is provided to address, but it needs 
to do it with sufficient indicia of reliability. 
What I have before me at this time in making my 
determination of whether or not there is sufficient indicia of 
reliability to this report is the underlying testimony of this 
officer, that he was present at both the initial interview and 
the hearing itself when a tape was offered by defendant's 
defense counsel on behalf of defendant, at a hearing where the 
defendant was present and where defense counsel was 
representing the defendant. 
The tapes were listened to by the—the—the tape was 
listened to by this witness at a hearing that has been 
established when the hearing was and that to his knowledge, 
from the statements of the officer, a police officer, who had 
the tape admitted, is that this was offered and was—there was 
a report made of that. 
I now have been given by the State this report. On 
the report itself, it is on a heading that is United States 
Secret Service, Office of Investigation, Forensic Service 
Division, Visual Information Branch, it is dated, it is 
referring to a tape that was received, it states how it was 
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received. It is—states that it is the results of the 
examination that were contained on—in a sealed container on 
the dates that it was received* 
Everything on its face is an indicia of its 
authenticity and its reliability and it is precisely the type 
of evidence that I see Rule 11-02 is to do it. Mr. Yengich 
has objected. His objections are noted. I am overruling the 
objection and admitting, per 11-02 for the purposes of this 
preliminary hearing, the report that has been marked as 
State's Exhibit No. 1. 
MR. YENGICH: Actually, it says amended report. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YENGICH: Which is also a—a factor in the 
determination of the reliability. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. And on— 
MR. YENGICH: And—and the report does not refer to 
any specific tape. It refers to one side of a tape. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YENGICH: Just so my objection is clear. 
THE COURT: Absolutely. The record will reflect— 
MS. SAMUELS: If I may respond to the amended 
report. Along—in that packet, which has also all been turned 
over to defense counsel, there is the amended report, the 
original report, as well as a third report. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
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The record has—will reflect the objections, will 
reflect the responses and will reflect my ruling and finding, 
that for, again, the very specific and limited purpose of the 
preliminary hearing, I am accepting Exhibit No. 1 and 
admitting it pursuant to 11-02. 
You may continue, Ms. Samuels. 
MS. SAMUELS: Okay. 
Q (By Ms. Samuels) And—and was the— 
MS. SAMUELS: Actually, your Honor, I think based on 
the tape, based on the report being admitted, I have no 
further questions for this witness. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination, Mr. Yengich. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. YENGICH: 
Q Where—where is the tape? 
A I do not know. 
Q You don't know? 
Where is your tape of your original interviews with 
Mr. Potts? 
A My tape is submitted into evidence at the Davis 
County Sheriff's Office. 
Q Now, did you compare your tape of the interview with 
Mr. Potts' tape, at any time? 
A As I testified earlier— 
Q No. My question is, did you compare the two tapes? 
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A No. I did not. 
Q And—and have—did you prepare a transcript of your 
tape of the interview? 
A I did not. 
Q All right. Did you request that a transcript of 
your tape of the interview be prepared? 
A I did not request one and I'm not sure if one was 
requested. 
Q Have you ever observed such a transcript? 
A No. I don't believe so. 
Q Did you send your tape of the interview with Mr. 
Potts to the F.B.I, for comparative purposes? 
A I do not have a tape of the same portion that was 
sent to the Secret Service. It was not recorded. 
Q Well, but my question was, did you send your tape to 
the F.B.I, for comparative purposes? 
A I do not know. I—I was not involved in that. I do 
not believe that it was sent. 
Q All right. Now, you—you did listen to your tape 
and the portions of your tape that cover this same area of 
inquiry that you're testified today are missing somehow; is 
that correct? 
A Yeah. There's an entire side of one tape that was 
not recorded. 
Q Did you intentionally delete that side? 
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A No. I did not. 
Q Do you know who did delete that side? 
A I don't believe it was deleted. I believe it was 
never recorded. 
Q Did you ever ask anybody to check your tape to 
determine whether or not it was intentionally deleted? 
Anybody such as the Secret Service? 
A Did not. 
Q You made a mistake? 
A Possibly. 
Q Okay. Possibly. 
Now, during the course of the time that you were 
interviewing Mr. Potts, this isn't at the hearing, this is in 
your interview with him, where was your tape in relationship 
to his, sir? 
A They were both sitting on my desk. 
Q They—and where was it in relationship to your tape 
recorder? Was it right next to it? Was it in front of you 
and—or in front of him or were they at different portions of 
the bench, do you know? 
A Well, it's a fairly small desk. I was sitting on 
one side, Mr. Potts was sitting on the other, and both 
recorders were sitting on top of the desk. 
Q Now, did you touch your tape recorder during the 
course of the recording? 
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A Yes. The recording went for several tapes, so there 
was—had to turn the tape over and exchange tapes. 
Q All right. Did Mr. Potts touch his tape recorder 
during the course of this meeting? 
A Yes. He had to do the same thing. 
Q And he had to do the same thing? 
How many times did Mr.—Mr. Potts touch his tape 
recorder during the course of this, the meeting that you had 
with him? 
A I don't know. 
Q Did you—do you recall whether or not Mr. Potts had 
to check to see whether his tape recorder was working, at any 
time? 
A No. I don't believe that he did. 
Q But my question is, is, do you recall whether he did 
or not? 
A I do not. 
Q All right. And did you have to check—did you check 
yours to see whether it was working? 
A The only time—the only time I manipulated my 
recorder was when I changed tapes or turned the tape over. 
Q Okay. So, under those circumstances, I want you to 
tell me when this critical portion that you've offered to the 
Court today, the statement that has been offered into evidence 
today that you say was not the same as you recalled it, and 
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that is to say, "Did you give him the palm pilot?" And the 
statement, "No", with no further explanation; when, during the 
course of the interview did that occur? First part? middle? 
end? 
A Probably two-thirds of the way through. 
Q Okay. And how long was the length of time for your 
interview with Mr. Potts? 
A Two-and-a-half to three hours. 
Q Two-and-a-half to three hours. Do you know what 
time—what length of tapes he was using in his recorder? 
A I do not. 
Q You don't? 
A No. I do not. 
Q All right. Do you know whether that question was 
asked toward the end of one of his tapes? 
A I do not. 
Q Do you know whether or not his tape had stopped 
playing at that time? 
A I do not. 
Q Do you know whether the tape had stopped playing and 
was turned back on again for further questions that were asked 
by you? 
A Do not. 
Q Okay. Did you—did you personally submit that type 
of question to the Secret Service for their analysis of his 
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tape? 
A I did not. 
Q And did you, for comparative purposes, give them 
your tape to see whether or not they could compare whether 
there was a similar time frame between the two? 
A Did not. 
Q Did you take handwritten notes during this 
interview? 
A I did not take notes, handwritten notes. 
Q All right. And so the critical question that we're 
dealing with today, or critical—critical series of questions 
is, you asked him whether or not, as I understand it, a palm 
pilot was brought to his house or delivered to his house, and 
the—and—and he said, I don't recall? 
A No. He said that it was— 
Q Okay. 
A —brought to his house. 
Q All right. During the interview with you? 
A During the interview— 
Q All right. 
A —he said that it was brought to his house. 
Q That's your recollection? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q All right. Now, did—do you recall the specific 
words that you asked him at that time, exactly as you asked 
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him? 
A I do not recall specific, exactly as I asked them. 
Q All right. Do you recall his exact answer in 
response to that question? 
A Not his specific, exact answer, no. 
Q Thank you. And when you heard the tape play when 
that question was asked, the answer that you recall hearing 
was "No"— 
A That's the answer— 
Q —is that correct? 
A —that was on the tape. 
Q That was the answer that was on the tape. Okay. 
And once again, did you determine what the follow-up 
question, your—your—your follow-up question during the 
interview was? What was your exact follow-up question, sir? 
Do you know? 
A I don't know exactly the way it was phrased— 
Q Okay. You don't? 
A —if that's what you're asking. 
Q All right. And do you know his exact response at 
that time? 
A I do not. 
Q And you didn't take handwritten notes in that 
regard? 
A I did not 
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Q Now, during the course of the interview, Conder 
offered the tape; right? Conder was the lawyer? 
A Not during the interview. 
Q I mean, during— 
A He was not present at the interview. 
Q —during the course of the hearing. Excuse me. 
Thank you for correcting me. 
Conder was the one that offers the tape; is that 
right? 
A That's correct. 
Q All right. Is there a transcript of that hearing? 
A There is. 
Q All right. And—and Conder is the one that plays a 
portion of the tape; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. And the portion that he plays is 
approximately about a minute to a minute-and-a-half; am I 
correct in that? 
A I would say one to two minutes. 
Q All right. And that's all he plays of that tape; i 
that true? 
A I believe so, yes. 
Q Have you ever been wrong, as an officer, before? 
A Certainly. 
Q All right. And you've made mistakes; right? 
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A Certainly. 
Q Okay. 
MS. SAMUELS: Objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'll overrule this for purposes of 
cross-examination. 
Q (By Mr. Yengich) Now, during the time that you 
interviewed Mr. Potts, was anybody else in the interview room 
with you? 
A No. 
Q Just the two of you? 
A Just me and Mr. Potts. 
Q When Conder offers the tape, what are the specific 
words that Con—Conder says when he offers the tape to the 
hearing officer? 
A I don't recall specifically. I do recall that he 
said it was an original recording. 
Q Well, that's, I guess, what's critical, is, is what 
were his words? This is—this is—"I believe this to be an 
original", or, "This is an original", or, "I got this as an 
original"; do you recall? 
A Cannot; but I do recall the word "original" being— 
Q You do—you recall the word "original"? Okay. 
And during the course of that, that—those are 
statements by Jerry Conder, they weren't Mr. Potts' 
statements; right? 
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A That's correct. 
Q All right. Now, it's fair Potts was—he was 
representing Potts; right? 
But Conder was the one that's making the statements; 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. Did you or anybody ask that the rest of the 
tape be played at the hearing? 
A No. 
Q Was—was the rest of the tape played at the hearing? 
A Not to my knowledge. 
Q Did—was there a request made that your request be 
played at the hearing? 
A Not that I recall. 
MR. YENGICH: May I ask the Court's indulgence for a 
moment? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (By Mr. Yengich) Help me here with your tape of 
this hearing. So, this—this—this critical statement or what 
you deemed to be a critical statement, occurs about two-thirds 
through your interview with him. Does your tape or do your 
tapes include information that occurred after that? 
A You mean questions that occurred after that? 
Q Yes, sir. 
A Yes. I believe they do. 
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Q So, your tapes go a portion of it, then there's a—a 
segment in the middle that is missing and then the conclusion 
of the interview; is that correct? 
A There—there is one entire side of one tape that is 
missing. 
Q Yeah. I understand that, but what is— 
A And there is information— 
Q —important to me is— 
A There's information before and after. 
Q There's information before and after? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Did you—you and Mr. Potts also talk while the tape 
recorders—while both of your tape recorders were off? 
A At the end, we had just a—you know— 
Q Continuing conversation? 
A Not continuing conversation. We had salutations 
and—and ended it, and that was basically it. We had no 
conversation of substance related to the allegations or 
related to the investigation. 
Q Basically, how you doing, what's going on, how's the 
family type of stuff? 
A Right. 
Q Okay. You didn't give the Secret Service any 
directions as to what you wanted them to look to, relative to 
these tapes; is that correct? 
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A I am not the one that submitted it to the Secret 
Service. I do not know what instructions were given to them. 
Q And indeed, in fairness to you, you don't even know 
which tape was submitted to them? I mean, you—you have a 
belief that it was the same tape; correct? 
A I've been told that it was the same tape— 
Q Okay. 
A —and that information was given to me by Chief 
Deputy Kevin McCloud. 
Q And you don't know what—you didn't have that tape 
into custody after the hearing, yourself, did you? 
A I did never—I did not have possession of that tape. 
Q The hearing occurred in 2000, the year 2000? 
A Correct. 
Q And it was submitted to the Secret Service in the 
calendar year 2001; is that right? To your knowledge? If you 
don't know, that's fine. 
Q You know, I'm not sure. 
Q Okay. Do you know where that tape was in the 
interim period of time? 
A I do not. 
Q Do you know whether or not that tape was played by 
anybody in the interim period of time? 
A I do not. 
Q Do you know whether anybody took—whether anybody 
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took out the—the portion of the tape that would prevent them 
from recording over it or erasing anything during that period 
of time? 
A Yes, during—during the hearing, when it was 
submitted, the break-out tabs were broken out, so it could not 
be— 
Q And was— 
A —inadvertently recorded over. 
Q —was that done in your—with your—have you done 
that with your tape as well? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. 
A Those were done with my tape when I first submitted 
them as part of the report. 
Q Now, were you—were you keeping any log as you went 
through? Sometimes when I interview people, I will keep a 
time log when I'm talking—talking to them; did you do 
anything like that? 
A During the interview? 
Q Yes, sir. 
A I did. I had—on my computer, I had typed up all 
the allegations and all the points that I wanted to interview-
-do—conduct the interview— 
Q Okay. 
A —with Mr. Potts. And I scrolled through those on 
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my computer as I went. 
Q Do you still have that? 
A That became the report that I submitted. 
Q So, you added things into it as you went along? 
A Right. 
Q Or—or you— 
A (Inaudible) 
Q —added things into it after the interview was 
concluded? 
A Yes. Immediately following the interview, I 
finished that as the report. 
MR. YENGICH: Ask the Court's indulgence for a 
moment, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Whatever you need, Mr. Yengich. 
I think he still may have a few more questions. 
MS. SAMUELS: Okay. 
MR. YENGICH: I have nothing further of the 
gentleman. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
MS. SAMUELS: Your Honor, I would just ask—and 
fortunately, I have made a copy of this, so I have a copy of 
the Career Service Council hearing from July 21st and in it is 
the presentation of the tape as it's been relayed by Mr. 
Sparks and let me just see if I can—maybe I can just read the 
key—the introduction. 
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MR. YENGICH: Could—could we have her sworn? 
THE COURT: I was going to say, if you're going to— 
MS. SAMUELS: Well, your Honor, this is a—this is a 
Career Service Council hearing, as I was not present at the 
hearing, I have a copy of the transcript and under reliable 
hearsay under 11-02, any—is it— 
THE COURT: What's the purpose of submitting this, 
given that I have already granted the— 
MS. SAMUELS: That's true, your Honor. Okay. 
THE COURT: —admission of the 11-02? That would go 
directly to the objection and I found that sufficient was 
done, so I don't— 
MS. SAMUELS: Okay. 
THE COURT: —see that that would serve any purpose, 
even for the 11-02 motion, so... 
MS. SAMUELS: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Anything further then? Thank you. 
This witness may step down. 
And no other witnesses from the State? 
MS. SAMUELS: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: State has rested. 
How, Mr. Yengich, does the defendant wish to 
proceed? 
MR. YENGICH: I want to think about it. 
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THE COURT: Okay, 
MR. YENGICH: I don't—I don't know—I—I guess I've 
been waiting for the State's theory— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YENGICH: —under communications fraud. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
MR. YENGICH: I don't see it at this point. The 
Court has—has accepted the— 
THE COURT: I've accepted the testimony that has 
been presented— 
MR. YENGICH: Right. 
THE COURT: —and the report. 
MR. YENGICH: I would ask—I would ask for two weeks 
to think about it and submit a memorandum. 
THE COURT: Okay. Want to argue (inaudible) 
MS. SAMUELS: Your Honor, I would think that at this 
point, it doesn't sound like Mr. Yengich has any further 
evidence. It seems appropriate to do oral arguments and this 
isn't a complicated presentation. 
THE COURT: Is—is there a specific research issue 
that you wish to do, Mr. Yengich? 
MR. YENGICH: Yeah, I don't think that they have—I 
want to research the communications fraud statute. I don't 
see where they've met any of the elements of this—of the—of 
the offense that they've charged. 
47 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
I'm going to deny that request for a continuance 
then, because the charge was the communications fraud, the 
elements are set forth and the defense and Mr. Yengich knew 
that that was the burden that the State needed to meet today, 
those elements are there and that that was certainly the 
notice. 
And for the purposes of a preliminary hearing 
argument, it certainly could be—it is reasonable that you are 
familiar enough— 
MR. YENGICH: Well, I am. 
THE COURT: —with the charge that— 
MR. YENGICH: I understand the charge. And we'll 
let her— 
THE COURT: Do you want to argue? 
MR. YENGICH: I do want to argue, but I would ask 
that she present her— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. YENGICH: —her version of how this meets that 
statute first. 
THE COURT: All right. Argument from the State 
then. Thank you. 
MS. SAMUELS: Your Honor, the State has charged the 
defendant with communications fraud in that the defendant, 
Duane Potts, did devise a scheme, artifice to defraud another 
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by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
promises or material omissions and did communicate directly or 
indirectly with any person by any means for the purpose of 
executing or concealing the scheme or artifice and the object 
of the scheme or artifice to defraud was other than the 
obtaining of something of monetary value, and that, of course, 
is a second-degree felony under that subsection. 
Our theory in the case is that the defendant 
presented or had—had this original tape that he recorded and 
altered it and presented it to the Career Council hearing 
board and he—he altered it in a means to defraud the board 
because he knew that if he was—clearly, by changing that, it 
changes the—changed the evidence in the case. And he was 
attempting to be reinstated since he had been dismissed, based 
in part on this allegation of bribery. 
And just to go over the evidence briefly, you have 
Captain Sparks' independent recollection of the interview as 
well as exactly what was—or his interview and substance of 
what was said in the interview. 
And in addition—so you have that inconsistency. In 
addition, you have the Secret Service report which notes five 
different points where—where the tape was altered. And most-
-and the one which jumps out, which is the one which Captain 
Sparks remembers exactly, is that, number one, it says at 
1307, there were—are indications of an edit between the word 
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1 "palm" and "I" in the sentence. If it was one down on the 
2 (inaudible) he says I got this palm, edit, I says I don't need 
3 a palm pilot, I don't know what it is. The very beginning of 
4 what is possibly the word "pilot" can be heard just before the 
5 edit point. 
6 And then it discusses five other points of edit. In 
7 addition, it mentions that there was a 130-second difference 
8 between the side of the tape which was analyzed where these 
9 edits occurred, which all occurred on the tape—on the portion 
10 of the tape which Captain Sparks did not have a copy of, that 
11 his one tape didn't record. 
12 And the report goes on and explains kind of how 
13 there are certain "no's" which are reported, which can be 
14 done, edited digitally in order to do that. 
15 So, it's clear that this tape was altered and this 
16 is communications fraud because the defendant devised the 
17 scheme in order to—to defraud the Court, basically, the 
18 hearing council. 
19 And based upon that, the State submits that there's 
20 probable cause that this felony has occurred. 
21 J THE COURT: Thank you. 
22 | Response argument, Mr. Yengich? 
23 | MR. YENGICH: I—I know that we're in a hurry. 
24 | THE COURT: We're not in a hurry. I'm— 
25 | MR. YENGICH: Sometimes believe that we forget the 
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real purpose of a preliminary hearing just isn't so that we 
can move cases along. I'm not talking about your Honor, but— 
but so that there—that—that he has to defend this case. 
That— 
THE COURT: And Mr. Yengich, I want to stop you 
right here. I am scheduled to do preliminary hearings all 
day— 
MR. YENGICH: I'll— 
THE COURT: —all week, and I will listen to the 
argument. The—the basis for my not granting continuance was 
entirely different from the Court's calendar. You are here 
to— 
MR. YENGICH: No, that's not what I— 
THE COURT: —argue and you may— 
MR. YENGICH: —I'm not impressing—I'm not 
impressing it; but I—what I'm saying is, is we forget the 
purpose of a preliminary hearing. The—a preliminary hearing 
isn't simply a—a hearing where anything can come forward and 
any—any quantum of evidence is sufficient to bind a person 
over because when the Court binds him over, he has to defend 
this case at trial. 
MS. SAMUELS: Your Honor, I'm going to object to 
this line of argument. Mr. Yengich can cite to the 
preliminary hearing standard, but to expound on the meanings 
of preliminary hearings, it does not address the evidence in 
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this case. 
THE COURT: Overruled. Mr. Yengich may argue. 
MR. YENGICH: The—what does the State say? The 
State says that there is a scheme or artifice to defraud. And 
what have they shown? They have shown that there was a tape 
that may have been altered. The—the report doesn't say that 
it was altered, it says that there is a probability that— 
that—or that is the reference that is made. 
The State offers it and they don't—they don't say 
that Mr. Potts offered it during the course of the hearing, 
they say his counsel did. They offer no evidence to indicate 
how his counsel got the tape or where the tape came from, who 
had custody of the tape in the meantime or whether or not Mr. 
Conder, who was his lawyer, or others who had the tape, had 
anything to do with it. 
They offer no evidence to indicate that, just as 
with the other gentleman's tape, that there were problems with 
the recording of it. Both tapes were set down right next to 
one another during the course of this and both of the 
individuals touched and moved their tapes and changed tapes 
during the course of the—during the course of the interview. 
Now, because Mr. Potts is the subject of the—the 
hearing, the hearing, the claim is that he devised a scheme or 
artifice to defraud the Court. The Court can't make that 
jump, that's the first point. The Court can't make that jump 
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simply because Mr. Potts is the subject of the hearing, 
particularly given the fact that the only evidence that the 
Court has, the only evidence that the Court has, is that it 
was offered by Mr. Conder, who made certain representations 
about the tape. 
There is no testimony before the Court that Mr. 
Potts testified about the tape or that Mr.—Mr. Potts, at any 
time, indicated that the tape was the same tape that he had 
recorded or that he had reviewed the tape at that time, or 
that it was orig—an original. 
There is also no evidence offered to the Court that 
Mr.—Mr. Conder did not offer this as a summary. 
There's also no evidence before the Court that— 
about the entirety of the tape, which is to say, one-and-a-
half minutes of this tape was played during the course of the 
hearing. No one requested that the balance of the tape be 
played, no one to this very day has requested that the balance 
of the tape to be—be played, to see whether or not at some 
later time, the specific question was asked and answered in 
response. 
Now, they have to prove that it's a scheme or 
artifice to defraud, they have to prove that Mr. Potts was the 
one that did it, and they have to prove a scheme or artifice 
and they have done neither in this particular case. The hope 
of the State is, is we'll throw the tape up there—or we won't 
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even throw the tape up, we'll throw—we'll throw a report from 
the Secret Service that says there—there—there might be 
alterations in this and we'll have this man testify that this 
is how—what he recalls. 
Now, his own tape recorder didn't work properly. 
That's acceptable, apparently; but the claim is, is that Mr. 
Potts somehow then comes up with this scheme or artifice to 
defraud because his lawyer presents a tape. There's no 
evidence of it. 
The preliminary hearing requires probable cause that 
a crime was committed, but it also—it—probable cause that 
the defendant committed the crime. So, they haven't shown a 
scheme or artifice to defraud. 
I would submit to the Court, the Court has ruled on 
this already as far as foundation, but you also can consider 
this relative to the report that they have prepared 
themselves. When you look at their report, the critical issue 
that is offered to the Court, they didn't test—there was no 
testimony about any of these other supposed alterations before 
the Court, no testimony about that. We don't know whether 
those were inadvertent alterations or—or whether they're even 
substantive to the issue before the Court. 
What is substantive to the issue before the Court is 
one question and that is, Did he say "no" at a particular time 
relative to the palm pilot? That's the only question that was 
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1 asked of the gentleman that was at the hearing. That's there-
2 -that's—that's the substance of the claim, that he presented 
3 a false statement or false testimony during the time. 
4 The officer himself that testified during this case 
5 cannot remember his specific, cannot recall the specific 
6 answer that was given by Mr. Potts and cannot recall the 
7 specific follow-up questions or when—and how they—when they 
8 occurred. 
9 Once again, I would submit to the Court that as far 
10 as the elements of this particular charge are concerned, that 
11 they haven't shown fraud. They've got to show more than "I 
12 remember it this way" and the tape remember it that way and 
13 that's all they've offered to the Court during the course of 
14 this hearing. 
15 And I'd ask the Court to dismiss the charges. When 
16 I asked for time to—to take a look at the statute, I had 
17 been—I literally had been waiting for what their theory is. 
18 And—and—and if that is their theory, I don't think it falls 
19 within the communications fraud statute, number one, and I 
20 don't think they've made the elements, number two. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you. 
22 Any further response? 
23 MS. SAMUELS: No, your Honor. 
24 I THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
25 | I appreciate the information that has been presented 
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1 to me today and the argument. It is all well intended and 
2 well taken and I have been carefully considering both the 
3 evidence that has been presented at this hearing today as well 
4 as the argument that has been made by the defense and by the 
5 State. 
6 I also am very aware of the probable cause standard 
7 that I must look to. I am hearing this case today solely for 
8 the purpose of determining whether or not probable cause has 
9 been shown that the offense of communications fraud has been 
10 committed and whether probable cause has been shown that Mr. 
11 Potts is the person who has consider—who committed that 
12 offense. It is not a determination of guilt or innocence. 
13 It is a determination of whether or not the evidence 
14 presented by the State shows that probable cause and I must 
15 look to it, according to case law and according to rule and 
16 statute in this role in the light most favorable to the State 
17 and that also allows that I may draw reasonable inferences in 
18 I favor of the State from the testimony. 
19 | I have carefully listened to the testimony that has 
20 I been presented by the captain in this matter, as well as 
21 I reviewed the audio authen—authenti—authentication 
22 I examination report that has been admitted as we've discussed 
23 | earlier already. 
24 | I do find that while Mr. Yengich's arguments and 
25 | questions raise very legitimate issues, that they go to the 
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weight, such as the weight to be given to the witness' 
recollections, whether or not the differences are in fact 
alterations or whether they are the result of mistakes, are 
issues that are for the trier of fact. 
The—the State's evidence clearly shows probable 
cause that there was a—that there were differences from the 
recollections of the original interview that Captain—is it 
Sparks? I'm sorry, I turned my page over from that—thank 
you, Captain Sparks had with the defendant, that clearly 
showed not only answers differences but portions missing and 
the report shows that there are indications of alterations of 
the tape and that certainly shows, sufficient for a 
preliminary hearing, probable cause that there was a scheme or 
conduct or an artifice in order to make those admissions— 
omissions or make those changes for the purposes of defrauding 
or misrepresenting facts to the hearing board in order to 
determine whether or not Mr. Potts ought to be reinstated. 
So, clearly, there's probable cause that meets each 
of the elements of the communications fraud. I went through 
it, step by step and element by element. 
The other question that Mr. Yengich raises on behalf 
of Mr. Potts is something the State must also show, whether or 
not there is probable cause that the defendant is the person 
who committed this fraud and not someone else. 
The evidence that has been presented is that the 
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statements were made and a tape was presented. The statements 
were made by Mr. Potts' attorney as his representative in a 
hearing where Mr. Conder was specifically there to represent 
Mr. Potts' interest at this hearing. 
And there is—the tape certainly reflected Mr. 
Potts' language and the tape had been—voice, and the tape had 
been obtained from Mr. Potts. 
I find that for the purposes of the preliminary 
hearing, that those are very reasonable inferences in favor of 
the State that I must make and do find that probable cause has 
been shown that the statements and conduct are representative 
of Mr. Potts and the fact that Mr. Conder may have been the 
one actually making the statements or presenting the tape, he 
was doing it as a representative of Mr. Potts, but that the 
conduct and the scheme and the fraud that the State is 
alleging was in fact Mr. Potts' fraudulent behavior as far as 
probable cause goes. 
So, for the purposes of preliminary hearing, this 
matter is bound over as charged in Count 1, communications 
fraud. 
Who is the assigned judge on this one? 
THE CLERK: Judge Frederick. 
I have May 30th (inaudible) 
THE COURT: I'm sorry? 
THE CLERK: May 30th or June 20th. 
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THE COURT: That's a week from Friday. 
MR. YENGICH: May what? 
THE CLERK: 30th. 
THE COURT: 30th. Or the next Friday, Judge 
Frederick has his law and motion calendars on Friday. One 
week from tomorrow is the 30th of May or the 6th of June? 
THE CLERK: 20th (inaudible) 
THE COURT: 20th of June. We go until mid-June. 
MR. YENGICH: I'm in trial on the 30th. 
THE COURT: Do you want— 
MR. YENGICH: You say the 20th? 
THE COURT: The 20th of June. 
MR. YENGICH: Yeah, that's good. 
THE COURT: Friday, June 20, before Judge Frederick. 
The case is now bound over. 
There—the report itself was admitted. I'm going to 
return that back to the State in this matter. I don't believe 
any other exhibits, tangible exhibits were admitted. 
All right. Thank you. 
MR. YENGICH: May we be excused? 
THE COURT: Is there anything else we need to 
address on it? Thank you. Appreciate everyone's work on 
this. Thank you. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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TRANSCRIBERS CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, Certified 
Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings; that I received an electronically 
recorded videotape of the within matter and under his 
supervision have transcribed the same into typewriting, and 
the foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 59, inclusive, to the 
best of my ability constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney 
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of 
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise 
interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 8th day of 
June, 2003. 
Transcriber f 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day 
of June, 2003. 
( S E A L ) 
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REPORTERS CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of Utah, 
do certify that I received an electronically recorded 
videotape of the within matter and caused the same to be 
transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 1 to 59, inclusive, to the best of my knowledge, 
constitute a full, true and correct transcription, except 
where it is indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings 
were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, attorney 
or relative of either party, or clerk or stenographer of 
either party or of the attorney of either party, or otherwise 
interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 9th day of 
June, 2003. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on August 1, 2003) 
3 (Court takes the bench at 8:59. There is one case heard 
4 previous to this. This case was heard at 9:06.) 
5 MR. YENGICH: Your Honor, Duane Potts. 
6 THE COURT: No. 10 on the. calendar, State of Utah 
7 versus Duane E. Potts, case No. CR02561. Mr. Yengich you're 
8 appearing for this defendant. 
9 MR. YENGICH: I am, your Honor. The defendant is 
10 present, and the Attorney General's Office represents Mr. — 
11 represents the State. I filed a motion to quash and dismiss 
12 over a month — well, almost exactly a month ago. 
13 THE COURT: Okay, but let first inquire, is Polly 
14 Samuels or anyone on her behalf here from the AG's office? 
15 MR. HAMP: Your Honor, I don't believe so. Richard 
16 Hamp of the State of Utah. I've got a colleague of mine 
17 outside trying to call her office and see if she's in or out, 
18 or if we have any type of an explanation as to when she might 
19 be here. 
20 THE COURT: I've noted, Mr. Yengich, your motion, and 
21 I've noted furthermore that there's no response filed to the 
22 motion, formal response by Ms. Samuels. My inclination at this 
23 point is, given her failure to appear, to grant your motion. 
24 MR. YENGICH: And I appreciate that. We know that she 
25 knew about this hearing because she contacted your clerk and 
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1 indicated that she was going to move for a continuance of the 
2 trial and wanted this left today. 
3 I like to be fair, but Ms. Samuels in this particular 
4 case, this is not unusual. We've been going through this. 
5 She's had plenty of opportunity to respond to the motion. 
6 Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, as I understand 
7 it, I could have asked that it be submitted on the brief over a 
8 week ago because she had not responded, and for that reason I'd 
9 ask the Court to grant the motion. 
10 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to grant your motion, 
11 Mr. Yengich, on the basis that there's been a failure by the 
12 State to respond in appropriate fashion. 
13 MR. YENGICH: Thank you. 
14 THE COURT: Not on the basis that th ere ought to be a 
15 higher standard or burden of proof. 
16 MR. YENGICH: I understand that. 
17 THE COURT: So you prepare an appropriate order — 
18 MR. YENGICH: All right. 
19 THE COURT: — and we will dismiss the case. 
20 MR. YENGICH: And just one thing. We argued that even 
21 under the lower standard that they had not met the burden. 
22 THE COURT: Well, and that's the basis upon which — 
23 MR. YENGICH: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: — besides her failure to appear. 
25 MR. YENGICH: Thank you, your Honor. I'll prepare an 
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1 order. 
2 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
3 (Other matters heard not pertaining to this case.) 
4 MS. SAMUELS: Your Honor, can we recall Duane Potts? 
5 I'm Polly Samuels here with the State. 
6 THE COURT: I will recall it, but your opposition and 
7 his client have left the courtroom, Ms. Samuels. 
8 MS. SAMUELS: I'm aware of that, your Honor. I 
9 apologize. I know it's 9:22 right now. I was anticipating 
10 orally arguing his motion to dismiss, although I do have it on 
11 paper as well and I can submit it to the Court. I'm rather 
12 surprised that Mr. Yengich would just run in and run out. 
13 THE COURT: Well, he didn't, ma'am. He did not run in 
14 and run out. He's been here since the time this calendar was 
15 started at 8:30 this morning, and he waited here until I called 
16 his matter, at which time he indicated that he did not think 
17 that you had intended to file a formal response, which there 
18 isn't one filed. Moreover, that he accepted the fact that you 
19 weren't here, but he expected you weren't going respond by 
20 written papers. 
21 Consequently when it came up on the calendar I granted 
22 his motion based on your failure to appear. So if you choose 
23 to pursue it further then you can take your remedy by filing an 
24 appropriate motion. 
25 MS. SAMUELS: Okay. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. 
2 MS. SAMUELS: I'll do that, and I apologize to the 
3 Court. I guess I apologize — 
4 THE COURT: Well, where's your formal response? You 
5 say you have it in papers but you haven't submitted them? 
6 MS. SAMUELS: I have them with me right here. 
7 THE COURT: Well, today's the day of the oral argument. 
8 MS. SAMUELS: This one's initially set for a trial, 
9 your Honor, on August 12th. Mr. Yengich, I received his papers 
10 on July 9th, and I apologize to the Court. I should have — 
11 THE COURT: And I don't mean to make little of your 
12 effort. I'm simply suggesting to you that today's the day of 
13 the oral argument and I don't have a memo from you responding 
14 to his complaint for his client. We needn't go into the 
15 particulars, but you're simply acknowledging to me here today 
16 that you have not filed papers heretofore; is that right? 
17 MS. SAMUELS: That's correct. 
18 THE COURT: Then do what you think is appropriate, but 
19 I've granted yhis request. 
20 MS. SAMUELS: Okay. At this point, just for the 
21 record, I'm going to approach the clerk and submit my motion, 
22 and I will take other — submit other motions. 
23 THE COURT: All right, you can leave your papers here. 
24 I (Hearing concluded.) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under my 
direction from the transmitter records made of these 
meetings. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and 
contains all of the evidence and all matters to which the 
same related which were audible through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore, the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 6th day of August 
2003. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2004 
Beverly Lowe' 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Utah County 
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FILES SISTRiCT COURT 
RONALD J. YENGICH, #3580 Third Judical District 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant AUG - h 2003 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 SALTJAKE^OUNTY 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 By _ (X) 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 Deputy Cl8rk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DUANE POTTS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 021903561 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
1. The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the defendant's Motion to Quash 
and to Dismiss. The matter was set on t h e ^ d a y of4*4y-by the court clerk on the court's 8:30 
calendar. The Motion and Memorandum were filed and served to the Attorney General's office on 
the 7th day of July. 
2. The Attorney General's office representing the plaintiff, State of Utah, did not 
respond to the defendant's written motion. At the time set for hearing, the Court took the bench at 
approximately ten minutes after nine o'clock. No Assistant Attorney General, specifically the 
Assistant Attorney General assigned to this case, Polly Samuels, appeared on this matter. Richard 
Hemp of the Attorney General's office was present, but indicated that he did not know where Ms. 
Samuel was. Ms. Samuel never contacted the Court relative to her lack of appearance prior to the 
time set for hearing. 
3. The Court having reviewed the Memorandum from counsel and the State having not 
replied and the matter having been submitted for decision, the Court makes the following findings: 
a) that the Court does not apply the higher standard of review mentioned by Judge 
Davis in State v. Robinson as cited in the memorandum of counsel. 
b) The Court applying the lower standard of proof at a preliminary hearing pursuant to 
State v. Pledger and State v. Clark, hereby finds that the State failed to prove: 
1) that the crime alleged in the information was committed under the standard 
of probable cause, and 
2) that the defendant committed any crime, pursuant to that standard. 
5. The Court thereby grants the Motion of the defendant to Quash for the following 
reasons: 
a) failure to prove probable cause at the preliminary hearing, 
b) failure to prove that the defendant committed the crime at the preliminary hearing, 
and, 
c) for the reason that the State has not responded or appeared. 
The bases for the Court's rulings are in the alternative. 
SIGNED BY MY HAND this W Azy of August, 2003. 
BY THE COURT 
HON! 
Third 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order, postage prepaid, 
this 1 day of August, 2003, to Polly Samuels, Assistant Attorney General, located at 236 State 
Capitol, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
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